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ABSTRACT  
   
Resource transfers can confer many adaptive benefits such as specialization, 
helping genetically related individuals, future compensation, and risk-pooling. Need-
based transfers are a risk-pooling mechanism in which partners mitigate unpredictable 
losses by transferring resources based on need. Need-based transfers are likely to be most 
useful for resources that are necessary and unpredictable because being unable to reliably 
obtain essential resources would be devastating. However, need-based transfers make 
people vulnerable to two types of exploitation: a person can be greedy by asking when 
not in need and a person with a surplus of resources can be stingy by not giving to 
someone in need. Previous research suggests that people might have cognitive 
mechanisms for detecting greediness and stinginess, which would serve to protect against 
exploitation by cheaters. This study investigated whether resources that are necessary and 
unpredictable are most likely to trigger greediness and stinginess detection mechanisms. 
Participants saw four types of rules. One rule could be violated through greedy behavior, 
another through stingy behavior, another by not paying a debt, and another was a 
descriptive rule that could be violated by not finding one type of resource near another 
type of resource. Then, participants saw information about events relating to one of the 
rules and indicated whether the rule in question could have been violated. Consistent with 
past research, participants were better at detecting greediness, stinginess, and debts not 
paid than at detecting violations of a descriptive rule. However, contrary to my 
predictions, the necessity and unpredictability of resources did not impact people’s ability 
to detect greediness and stinginess. The lack of support for my hypothesis might be 
because the benefits of detecting greediness and stinginess might outweigh the costs even 
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for situations in which need-based transfer rules are unlikely to apply, because people 
might be able to consciously activate their greediness and stinginess mechanisms even for 
resources that would not naturally trigger them, or because of methodological limitations. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are on a camping trip in a dry region. During your time 
camping, a stranger walks up to you and says that they are almost out of water. Then, 
they ask you to pour some of your water into their canteen. Now imagine a different 
scenario. In this new scenario, you are walking down the main street of a metropolitan 
city while eating ice cream. This time, a stranger walks up to you and says that they are 
almost out of ice cream. Then, they ask you to scoop some of your ice cream into their 
ice cream bowl. A simple monetary maximization model would predict that if the value 
of the ice cream and of the water requested is equivalent, then your response to both 
requests should be the same. In reality, you might be willing to give some of your water 
in the first scenario, while you might consider the person requesting ice cream in the 
second scenario to be greedy and deny their request. Now imagine that the tables are 
turned and you are the one asking for water and ice cream from a stranger. You might 
think the stranger is stingy if they deny your request for water, while you might not take 
offense if the stranger denies your request for ice cream. Why do different resources lead 
to different perceptions of greediness and stinginess? 
It is useful to consider an evolutionary perspective to investigate why decisions 
about whether someone is stingy or greedy depend on the type of resource involved. 
Evolutionary theory suggests that engaging in resource transfers could make people 
vulnerable to cheating. Throughout this paper, I use the word cheating to refer to a 
violation of resource transfer rules in the pursuit of personal fitness gain and at the 
expense of the transfer partner. Given this vulnerability to cheating, there should have 
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been selection pressure for cheater detection mechanisms that would allow people to 
identify instances of cheating. Consistent with this prediction, research has found that 
people have cognitive mechanisms for detecting debts not paid, greediness, and 
stinginess (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Munoz et al., in prep). Building on this line of 
research, I propose that greediness and stinginess detection mechanisms are not part of a 
general-purpose reasoning system, but rather specialized adaptive mechanisms. 
Specifically, I propose that greediness and stinginess detection mechanisms should be 
attuned to at least two characteristics of the resources being transferred: resource 
necessity and unpredictability. Resources that are high on necessity and unpredictability, 
such as water in the camping scenario described above, should be particularly likely to 
trigger greediness and stinginess detection. On the other hand, resources that are low on 
necessity and unpredictability, such as ice cream in the second scenario, should be 
particularly unlikely to trigger greediness and stinginess detection. 
People would not need greediness and stinginess detection mechanisms if there 
were no resource transfers. It might seem counterintuitive that natural selection would 
favor resource transfer mechanisms that make organisms vulnerable to cheating. 
However, resource transfers, including dyadic resource transfers, can also confer 
immense fitness benefits.  
There are Multiple Benefits to Engaging in Resource Transfers 
One evolutionary benefit from engaging in resource transfers is the ability to save 
time and energy through specialization. Transferring resources can allow individuals to 
specialize in fulfilling one need while relying on other individuals to help them fulfill 
their other needs (Nowak, 2006). This can be especially useful if different necessary 
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resources require different skill sets that can be improved upon over time and if obtaining 
these resources is time consuming and effortful. In such a situation, attempting to gather 
all necessary resources oneself might not be as efficient as investing time to perfect the 
skills needed to gather a subset of resources and then trading some of those resources 
with people who have specialized in obtaining other kinds of resources.  
From an evolutionary perspective, another advantage of dyadic resource transfers 
occurs among genetic relatives. Individuals who manage to increase the fitness of other 
individuals who are genetically related to them, i.e., genetic kin, are indirectly boosting 
their own fitness because genetic relatives share many of the same genes.  Hamilton’s 
rule is one theory that describes the kinds of circumstances under which we would expect 
to see altruistic behavior towards kin — including some types of dyadic resource 
transfers. Hamilton’s rule suggests that inclusive fitness is adaptive if the benefits 
multiplied by the relatedness between the giver and the recipient are greater than the costs 
incurred by the giver (Hamilton, 1964). In humans, some evidence has been found that 
people tend to help close relatives even if this means incurring a cost to themselves and 
that they help close relatives more than non-relatives and distant relatives (Essock-Vitale 
& McGuire, 1985 and Kruger, 2003).  
Kin selection explains the benefit of some types of resource transfers between 
genetically related dyads, but it does not explain how resource transfers between 
unrelated dyads could have evolved. Humans provide many different types of help to 
non-kin, including help in the form of resource transfers (Hruschka, 2010). One study 
found that people tended to link kinship cognitions to people with similar attitudes as 
their own and that people were more inclined to help people who had been linked to 
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kinship cognitions (Park & Schaller, 2004). One explanation for these findings is that 
altruism between non-kin represents a misfiring of cognitive mechanisms that evolved for 
recognizing kin. However, other research suggests that people across different societies 
apply kinship terminology on the basis of fitness interdependence, or the extent to which 
organisms influence each other’s gene replication success (Cronk et al., 2019). This 
analysis of how people apply kinship terminology suggests that random misfiring might 
not be responsible for the linking of kinship cognitions to non-genetic-relatives. Instead, 
at least in the case of kinship terminology, it appears that people might co-opt kinship 
cognitions and link them to non-kin for adaptive purposes.  
Evolutionary theorists have long proposed that helping non-kin might be an 
adaptation on its own rather than a misfiring of kin recognition. One of these researchers, 
Robert Trivers, proposed the theory of reciprocal altruism to explain how non-kin 
altruism can be adaptive (1971). Trivers proposed his theory of reciprocal altruism as an 
explanation for altruism in general, but it can be applied to dyadic resource transfers. 
Reciprocal altruism proposes that the evolution of resource transfers without immediate 
reciprocation can evolve when the short-term cost to the giver is less than the benefit to 
the recipient and less than the long-term benefit to the giver.  
Reciprocal altruism goes beyond kin selection to shed light on the viability of 
altruism without the need for close genetic relatedness. This theory also revolutionized 
the study of altruism by ceasing to consider altruistic acts as occurring in a one-shot 
vacuum and instead recognizing that fitness costs and gains accumulate over repeated 
encounters. Therefore, reciprocal altruism lay the foundation for other researchers to 
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propose cognitive mechanisms through which resource transfers could take place without 
the need for immediate repayment.  
Another theory, known as the need-based transfer framework, proposes that 
unilateral resource transfers between dyads can evolve through providing risk 
management benefits (Aktipis et al., 2016; Hao et al, 2015). In need-based transfer 
systems, a person who is in need can request resources from their partner (Aktipis, 
Cronk, & De Aguilar, 2011; Cronk et al., 2019). Their partner will then grant them the 
requested resources if enough resources are available to give, such that the giver would 
remain above the need threshold. Participation in need-based transfer relationships can 
enhance fitness by increasing the likelihood that people will have enough resources in 
times of need. Thus, the theory behind need-based transfers suggests that they should 
enable unilateral resource transfers between dyads to be evolutionarily stable, as long as 
the risk management benefits for the giver are greater than the short-term cost of the 
transfer.  
To test the theory behind need-based transfers, researchers used agent-based 
models with parameters based on the Maasai system of transfers (Aktipis et al., 2016; 
Aktipis et al., 2011; Hao et al, 2015). Maasai pastoralists in East Africa have 
relationships known as “osotua,” which translates as “umbilical cord.” Osotua partners 
help each other in times of need without an expectation of repayment. These relationships 
allow the Maasai to survive when they experience unexpected losses due to events such 
as droughts. Extensive fieldwork has shown that  need-based transfer relationships, in 
which risk is pooled to guard against unexpected catastrophes, are common across many 
societies in addition to the Maasai (Cronk et al., 2019).  
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Need-based transfer rules in the models are based on osotua relationships, such 
that agents are only allowed to ask when in need and when asked, agents must give as 
long as they have enough resources to do so without falling below a threshold for need 
(Aktipis et al., 2011). The first set of models compared need-based transfers to systems 
where there are no transfers and to probabilistic rules for giving and requesting resources. 
In the models, all agents were assigned 70 cattle and each round, there was a probability 
that some of those cattle would be eliminated. These parameters were based on the 
ecological reality of Maasai pastoralism as reported by Dahl and Hjort (1976). The results 
of the model showed that need-based transfers resulted in longer herd survival than any 
of the other rules tested.  
Additional agent-based modeling studies have looked at the network features that 
result in the greatest herd survival (Hao et al., 2014). Researchers found that larger 
networks and a larger proportion of network connections switched at random — as long 
as the proportion is 30% or less — result in greater herd survival if the wealthiest partner 
in the network is asked for resources. Moreover, the models showed that networks with 
connections between more agents led to greater herd survival, regardless of whether 
asking is random or selective towards the wealthiest partner.   
The need-based transfer literature has also contrasted need-based transfer rules 
with another set of potential resource transfer rules: debt-based transfers (Aktipis et al., 
2016). In a debt-based transfer, the decision to transfer a resource depends on information 
about the recipient’s likelihood to pay back (what has been often called reciprocity or ‘tit-
for-tat reciprocity’). Once a resource is given, the giver in a debt-based transfer keeps 
track of the amount given and the time it takes the recipient to pay for the benefit 
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received. The giver then uses this information to inform decisions about future transfers 
with that partner. In contrast, a need-based transfer does not involve a desire for 
repayment other than the expectation that if one of the partners is ever in need, the other 
partner will give if able. Debt-based transfers are based on the Maasai term “sile”, which 
indicates a transaction where debt is accrued and there is an expectation of repayment 
after a resource transfer.  
Modeling work that compares need-based transfers with debt-based transfers used 
a five-step model schedule. In the first step, herds increase in size. Then, a disaster has a 
probability of striking, which would decrease the herd size. Then, agents are allowed to 
request and transfer resources using either need-based transfer or debt-based transfer 
rules. Finally, the round ends by checking whether agents survived. Agents who fail to 
stay above a minimum threshold for two consecutive rounds are considered to be no 
longer viable and are removed from the model.  
The results of this modeling work show that need-based transfers led to greater 
herd survival than debt-based transfers (Aktipis et al., 2016). Need-based transfers also 
led to greater wealth equality. The results of the model suggest that need-based transfers 
are particularly useful in volatile ecologies where there are unpredictable events that 
result in losses. When the likelihood and severity of losses are very low (very low 
volatility), all individuals survive. When the likelihood and severity of losses is very high 
(very high volatility), all agents perish quickly. At any point between very low volatility 
(where all herds survive) and very high volatility (where all herds die), need-based 
transfers perform better than debt-based transfers. The researchers also found that need-
based transfers are crucially dependent on high levels of generosity.  Rules that are less 
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generous, such that agents with enough resources give to their partners in need only 
sometimes, do not outperform debt-based transfers and models with no transfers. 
The need-based transfer rules that have been explored through this modeling work 
are consistent with Trivers’ theory in that they both argue that sometimes it can be 
adaptive for organisms to incur costs by transferring resources to another organism. 
However, Trivers’ theory of reciprocal altruism and the need-based transfer framework 
have different theoretical underpinnings. Reciprocal altruism focuses on the benefits that 
might be gained in the long-term by incurring a short-term cost. In contrast, the need-
based transfer framework was proposed as a mechanism for risk management, so its 
focus is on the catastrophic losses that can be mitigated by forming long-term 
partnerships of mutual insurance. 
In addition to their theoretical differences, these two frameworks lead to different 
predictions about the specific cognitive architecture that would be involved in resource 
transfers. A main difference between reciprocal altruism and need-based transfers is the 
consideration of symmetry of exchanges. Trivers suggests that reciprocal altruism should 
be most likely to occur when there are repeated interactions, when there are several 
situations in which the cost to one partner will be smaller than the benefit to another, and 
when partners are exposed to roughly symmetrical exchanges, such that both give at 
roughly equal cost to themselves and receive roughly equal benefits over the long term. 
The need-based transfer framework doesn’t assume that symmetry of exchanges is 
necessary for the emergence of need-based transfers. Instead, resource transfers operate 
based on need as a mechanism for mitigating risk. As such, need-based transfers can be a 
stable strategy even when there is asymmetry of exchanges, if the risk of not maintaining 
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the partnership to mitigate the risk of catastrophic unpredictable losses would be too 
great. This notion is supported by agent-based modeling work that suggests that need-
based transfers, which did not include any parameters requiring symmetry of exchanges 
in the models, can outcompete systems with no transfers (Aktipis et al., 2011; Aktipis et 
al., 2016), probabilistic transfer rules (Aktipis et al., 2011), and debt-based transfers 
(Aktipis et al., 2016).  
Several Frameworks Suggest that Different Transfer Rules Apply in Different 
Situations 
Similar to the literature that compares need-based transfers to debt-based 
transfers, other researchers have recognized that different transfer rules apply depending 
on the situation and that sometimes, there is no expectation for repayment. One 
framework argues that different types of relationships are characterized by different rules 
for how to transfer resources (Clark & Mills, 1979). In their framework, Clark and Mills 
make a distinction between communal and exchange relationships. Communal 
relationships are characterized by transfers that do not require repayment and are 
typically given with the aim of fulfilling the partner’s needs and desires. Moreover, 
communal partners actively avoid keeping accounts of what has been given and what has 
been received. On the other hand, exchange relationships involve keeping accounts and 
expecting debts to be repaid.  
Most of the research involving this framework has sought to establish that people 
in communal relationships avoid keeping accounts (Clark & Mills, 2012). For example, 
one study involved participants meeting a confederate and being placed in one of two 
conditions (Clark, 1984). In one condition, male participants were given a description of 
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the confederate that suggested that she was looking for friends and possibly a romantic 
partner. The researchers argued that this condition led participants to desire a communal 
relationship with the confederate. In another condition, participants read a description of 
the confederate that suggested that she would not be interested in becoming neither 
friends nor romantically involved with them. The researchers argued that this condition 
discouraged participants from desiring a communal relationship with the confederate.  
Then, participants were asked to work on a task that involved working with a pen. 
They were instructed to alternate work on the task between themselves and the 
confederate. They were also told that they would be splitting the reward at the end of the 
session with the confederate and that they could split the amount however they liked. The 
participants had the option of working with two different colored pens.  
The results of this experiment showed that participants that had a desire to form a 
communal relationship with the confederate chose to work with the same color of pen as 
the confederate more often than they chose to work with a different color of pen. They 
found the opposite pattern for the condition where participants did not have a desire to 
form a communal relationship with the confederate. The researchers argued that these 
results were evidence that people who desire communal relationships avoid keeping 
accounts since choosing the same color of pen as the confederate made it impossible to 
keep track of how much work each person had contributed.  
Clark and Mills do not distinguish between different types of close relationships 
and include friend, mate, and kin relationships as part of a single category governed by 
the same transfer rules of communal relationships. Nonetheless, Clark and Mills’ findings 
about people sometimes avoiding keeping accounts is consistent with research on 
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friendship. Studies on friendship suggest that friends are much less concerned with 
maintaining both short-term and long-term balance of transfers than are strangers and 
acquaintances (Hruschka, 2010). One cross-cultural study that included participants from 
the United States, Japan, and China found that not only are friends more tolerant of 
imbalances in payoffs than strangers, but people also monitor their friends less than they 
do strangers (Xue & Silk, 2012). Moreover, other studies have found that people tend to 
give more to friends than to casual acquaintances, that an evaluation of need is an 
essential component of deciding whether to give to a friend, and that people are more 
likely to give to friends to meet their needs than to choose an equal distribution of surplus 
(Schwinger & Lamm, 1981). These findings have led some researchers to note that while 
primatology researchers often use evidence of repayment of goods and services as an 
indication of friendship, human friendships seem to be characterized by a lack of both an 
expectation for repayment and account-keeping (Silk, 2003; Silk, 2002). 
Some researchers have argued that an expectation of repayment is still present in 
friendships, but that the timescale is elongated, such that people don’t expect immediate 
repayment from friends (Shackelford & Buss, 1996). They argue that the shadow of the 
future in exchange relationships is short because we don’t know whether we will interact 
repeatedly with an exchange relationship partner over the long-run. In contrast, they 
argue that friendships have an extended shadow of the future, which leads to a longer-
term tolerance for repayment of debts. However, this theory is incompatible with Clark 
and Mills’ findings about how friends and people seeking a friendship obscure their 
contributions to joint tasks to make it harder for account-keeping to occur (Clark & Mills, 
2012; Silk, 2003).  
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Another theory for understanding friendships from an evolutionary perspective is 
known as the Banker’s Paradox (Tooby & Cosmides, 1996). The Banker’s Paradox is 
that when someone needs help the most, they often have a bad credit rating and are less 
likely to receive a loan. Cosmides and Tooby view choosing friends much like a banker 
would choose who to loan money to. They argue that given that people have limited 
resources and time, the key to receiving help when you need it is to choose the right 
friends. Cosmides and Tooby explore the cognitive calculus that people might employ 
when choosing their friends. For instance, they predict that people are likely to assess 
potential friends based on whether their potential friends consider them to be 
irreplaceable. If your friends consider you to be irreplaceable, it is more likely that they 
will be willing to provide help when you need it.  
Although the purpose of need-based transfers is not to provide a framework for 
understanding friendship, need-based transfers are likely to occur among friends and they 
might help us to understand one of the adaptive benefits of friendship. Recent theoretical 
work has suggested that it is beneficial to consider friendship through the lens of 
evolutionary theory and to specify the algorithms that might be involved in this type of 
relationship (Hruschka, Hackman, & Macfarlan, 2015; Hruschka & Silk, 2015). Need-
based transfers propose an evolutionary benefit to engaging in these types of transfers: 
risk-pooling. Although need-based transfers can also occur among kin, expanding the 
size of the risk pooling network beyond kinship ties can provide a wider safety net that 
could further buffer against unpredictable events (Aktipis et al., 2018; Cronk et al., 2019; 
Hao et al, 2015).  
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Moreover, need-based transfers specify the algorithms that might be employed in 
this type of transfer: only ask when in need and give if able. These algorithms set need-
based transfers apart from the evolutionary frameworks for friendship discussed thus far. 
Clark and Mills performed rigorous testing to establish that people in communal 
relationships, unlike people in exchange relationships, avoid keeping accounts. However, 
they didn’t specify what the rules for transferring resources in communal relationships 
might be or whether these rules could be violated in specific ways.  
The shadow of the future framework proposed by Shackelford also differs from 
the need-based transfer framework. The shadow of the future framework for friendship 
predicts that people should always keep accounts of debts. In contrast, the need-based 
transfer framework suggests that some transfers are made without an expectation of 
repayment other than the implicit agreement that if a need ever arises, help will be 
provided. Research on friendship, consistent with research on communal relationships, 
suggests that friends are less concerned with keeping accounts and balancing transfers 
than strangers (Hruschka, 2010; Clark and Mills, 2012). However, although less often 
than among strangers, some tracking of payoffs does seem to occur among friends (Xue 
& Silk, 2012). This finding is also consistent with the need-based transfer framework. 
The need-based transfer framework allows for different types of transfers to occur within 
the same relationship depending on the situation. For example, research finds that 
ranchers in the Malpai borderlands of Arizona and New Mexico invoke need-based 
transfer rules and rely on their neighbors for help when they sustain an injury that 
prevents them from working (Cronk et al., 2019). However, ranchers also often engage in 
  14 
debt-based transfers with the same neighbors by engaging in transactions such as the 
purchase of equipment from each other or payments for specialized labor.  
The Banker’s Paradox proposed by Tooby and Cosmides leads to some of the 
same predictions as the need-based transfer framework, but the algorithms that are 
specified by each of these frameworks address different questions. Both need-based 
transfers and the Banker’s Paradox recognize the value of having relationships with 
people that will help you when you’re in need. However, the Banker’s Paradox 
framework sees these relationships as a banker providing loans, which implies that 
account-keeping and debt collection would likely be components of these transfer 
relationships. In contrast, debt is not generated or tracked after a need-based transfer 
takes place. Moreover, the Banker’s Paradox focuses on identifying the cognitive 
architecture underlying the process of choosing a friend, whereas the need-based transfer 
framework specifies rules of engagement during resource transfers. 
Another influential framework that focuses on classifying different types of 
relationships was proposed by Alan Fiske (1992). Fiske’s framework proposes that there 
are four main types of relationships. Fiske argues that many aspects of human social 
behavior, including planning, production, and coordination, can be evaluated using these 
four kinds of relationships. Therefore, resource transfers are one of many social behaviors 
that Fiske thought could be evaluated by recognizing four different types of relationships. 
The first type of relationship, called communal sharing, is characterized by common 
property, where people take what they need from a common pool of resources. The 
second kind of relationship is called authority ranking. In this kind of relationship, there 
is an imbalance of power. The more powerful individual can take what they want and the 
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less powerful individual can do little about it. The third type of relationship, equality 
matching, involves transfers that are aimed at maintaining egalitarian contributions and 
benefits received. People often keep track of transfers in this kind of relationship. The last 
kind of relationship is called market pricing. In this kind of relationship, people keep 
strict accounts and employ ratios to make sure a fair payment is made for resources 
received. 
The need-based transfer framework differs from the Fiske framework, just as it 
does from the communal relationship framework, in that it does not claim that a 
particular dyadic relationship will consistently use the same rules for exchanging 
resources. The relationship literature has focused on classifying relationships by transfer 
format. In doing this, relationship frameworks don’t recognize that the same relationship 
could employ different transfer rules at different times and in different contexts. Clark 
and Mills have briefly and partially addressed such challenges by stating that there might 
be other categories of hybrid relationships that are a mix between exchange and 
communal relationships. However, Clark and Mills have not elaborated on what rules 
would be followed in such hybrid relationships. Furthermore, even the addition of more 
categories, such as in Fiske’s four-category framework, does not address the assumption 
that each relationship involves the use of transfer rules that are characteristic of that 
particular relationship. The need-based transfer framework does not claim that particular 
relationships only use one type of rule. Rather, the need-based transfer framework 
suggests that there are multiple transfer rules that can be employed by many different 
types of dyads depending on the situation.  
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Research on resource transfers is not limited to work with humans. Researchers in 
primatology have also recognized the need to identify the different rules underlying 
resource transfers. One framework proposes three different cognitive mechanisms for 
reciprocal altruism: symmetry-based, attitudinal, and calculated reciprocity (Brosnan & 
de Waal, 2002). Symmetry-based reciprocity involves the formation of a relationship 
between two individuals in which there is no need to keep track of transfers over time. 
Rather, give and take occurs in both directions, as long as the relationship remains 
satisfactory.  
Attitudinal reciprocity involves exhibiting an altruistic predisposition and then 
mirroring the behavior of the other partner during subsequent transfers. Researchers have 
sought support for this mechanism through tray-pulling experiments with capuchin 
monkeys (de Waal & Berger, 2000). In one variation of these experiments, both monkeys 
in a pair have to pull on a rope attached to a tray in order for one of the monkeys to 
obtain a food reward. The researchers argue that if the monkeys didn’t have cognitive 
mechanisms for attitudinal reciprocity, no reward would be obtained since one of the 
monkeys in the pair would not be motivated to pull on the rope. However, these studies 
found that often both monkeys would pull on the rope and that the monkey that received 
the reward would usually share the reward with the other monkey. This occurred even in 
cases when there was no prior acquaintance between the monkeys. 
The third type of mechanism described by Brosnan and de Waal is known as 
calculated reciprocity. This type of reciprocity involves keeping track of previous 
exchanges with a specific individual in the long run to determine whether or not it would 
pay off to behave altruistically with that particular individual (Brosnan & de Waal, 2002). 
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This type of reciprocal altruism requires a high degree of cognitive complexity. It 
involves considering previous exchanges over long periods of time and using that 
knowledge to inform each decision about whether it would pay to behave altruistically or 
not towards a specific individual. This type of mechanism usually includes an expectation 
to receive a form of payment in return for favors granted in the past. The requirement for 
high cognitive capacity limits the number of species that could possess cognitive 
mechanisms for calculated reciprocity. In fact, it has mostly been observed in 
chimpanzees and in humans (Brosnan & de Waal, 2002). One study found that 
chimpanzees commonly rely on calculated reciprocity (de Waal, 1997). This study 
reported that chimpanzees that had groomed other chimpanzees in the morning received 
more food in the afternoon from the chimpanzees that they had groomed than from the 
chimpanzees that they had not groomed.  
Brosnan and deWaal argue that symmetry-based reciprocity is the most common 
of these three mechanisms and is likely to be the most ancient. They also argue that 
calculated reciprocity is the rarest, the most complex, and probably the most recent of the 
three. However, this framework does not make specific predictions about whether each of 
these mechanisms serves a different evolutionary function.  
Sahlins’ typology in the field of anthropology is another framework that defines 
different types of dyadic transfers (1972). Sahlins argues that there are three different 
types of dyadic transfers: generalized reciprocity, balanced reciprocity, and negative 
reciprocity. Generalized reciprocity involves a transfer in which the giver does not expect 
immediate repayment. Rather, the time allowed for repayment is indefinite and the 
payment does not need to be equal in quality or quantity to the resource that is received. 
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Generalized reciprocity roughly corresponds to Brosnan et al.’s symmetry-based 
reciprocity in that both mechanisms allow for an agent to give repetitively without 
receiving a payment, although generalized reciprocity does not make an emphasis on the 
role of relationship satisfaction for the continuation of these types of transfers.  
Unlike generalized reciprocity, balanced reciprocity involves resource transfers 
that require immediate repayment. Thus, balanced reciprocity is similar to attitudinal 
reciprocity in that failure to receive payment would result in termination of the transfers. 
However, balanced reciprocity is different in that it does not require an initial altruistic 
disposition. Finally, negative reciprocity involves one person taking resources from 
another without consent and without giving anything in return. Negative reciprocity does 
not have an equivalent in Brosnan et al.’s typology since Brosnan et al. focus on 
mechanisms that involve incurring a cost to increase the fitness of someone else. Sahlins’ 
typology does not explain how these different types of transfers might have been shaped 
by evolution.  
The Need-Based Transfer Framework Makes Specific Predictions About the 
Cognitive Architecture for Cheater Detection 
Debt-based transfers are similar to calculated reciprocity, balanced reciprocity, 
and exchange relationships. Need-based transfers are similar to symmetry-based 
reciprocity, generalized reciprocity, and communal relationships. However, one major 
distinction between the need-based transfer framework and the rest of the frameworks 
discussed thus far is that the need-based transfer framework makes specific predictions 
about what constitutes a violation of the rules, because the rules are algorithmically 
specified. The Brosnan et al. framework argues that transfers that follow the rules of 
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symmetry-based reciprocity would continue if the relationship remains satisfactory. 
However, it is not clear what would cause the relationship to cease to be satisfactory. 
Therefore, it is not clear what would constitute a violation of symmetry-based reciprocity.  
Similarly, Sahlins does not state what constitutes a violation of generalized 
reciprocity. Sahlins states that failure to pay back does not lead the giver to stop giving 
under generalized reciprocity transfers. Therefore, he makes clear that failure to pay back 
is not a violation, but does not state what is a violation. The Clark and Mills framework 
mainly focuses on how people avoid keeping accounts in communal relationships. 
Therefore, keeping accounts might be considered a violation in communal relationships. 
This framework also suggests that people in communal relationships are responsive 
towards their partner’s needs and desires but does not discuss explicitly what would be 
considered a violation of communal rules.  
In contrast to previous frameworks of resource transfer mechanisms, the need-
based transfer framework explicitly states what counts as a violation of the rules. There 
are two possible violations in need-based transfers. First, a person with a surplus of 
resources could be stingy and refuse to give resources to someone in need. Second, a 
person could be greedy and ask for resources when not in need. Therefore, this 
framework suggests that even when people engage in transfers where there is no keeping 
of accounts, people must still be vigilant to the possibility of these types of cheating.  
From an evolutionary standpoint, the need-based transfer framework’s specificity 
about what constitutes a violation is a major strength because it recognizes that resource 
transfer systems can be vulnerable to cheating without adequate safeguards and it allows 
for predictions about potential cheater detection mechanisms. Even though cooperative 
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resource transfers can provide several adaptive benefits, cooperation is not always the 
preferred strategy. Following the rules of resource transfers can result in a large payoff in 
the long-run, but choosing the selfish option often provides a larger immediate reward 
(Trivers, 1971). Simulation games of a situation known as “cheater invasion” show that if 
cheaters cannot be identified and punished, a population of cooperators that rely on 
random interactions will be overtaken by the dominant cheating strategy (Axelrod, 1984).  
Being able to detect cheaters is advantageous from an evolutionary standpoint 
because it allows people to retaliate against cheaters, thus reducing the likelihood that 
others would want to cheat them. Cheater invasion simulation games that show cheating 
to be the winning strategy over cooperation often rely on random interactions (Axelrod, 
1984). However, if cheating can be identified in these simulation games and cooperators 
are able to either punish cheaters or selectively interact with cooperators, cooperation 
becomes a more successful strategy than cheating (Aktipis, 2011; Barclay & Willer, 
2007). Following this logic, studies have investigated retaliatory behavior and found that 
people are likely to punish cheating even if it means incurring a cost themselves to do so 
(Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gächter, 2002). Additionally, models have shown that walking 
away from relationships can also serve to protect cooperators, as well as to indirectly 
inflict costs on cheaters (Aktipis, 2011).  
Trivers recognized that cheating can be a threat to the viability of reciprocal 
altruism  (Trivers, 1971). For Trivers, cheating meant a failure to act altruistically 
towards another person in a situation in which the immediate cost of behaving 
altruistically for the actor is lower than the immediate benefit to the recipient. If cheaters 
receive the benefits of altruistic acts without having to act altruistically themselves, 
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people possessing cheating alleles would be more successful than people possessing 
altruistic alleles. Therefore, he included as part of his model the need for altruists to cease 
to behave altruistically towards people who cheat (Trivers, 1971). This form of 
punishment towards cheaters would require that people possess cognitive mechanisms for 
identifying cheating. Although Trivers doesn’t explicitly discuss this, reciprocal altruism 
suggests that a potential recipient of an altruistic act must engage in a cognitive process 
to assess the size of the immediate benefit to themselves and compare it to the immediate 
cost to the giver. If the potential recipient determines that the benefit to themselves is 
greater than the cost to the giver, and the giver refuses to help, the potential recipient 
should be able to identify this situation as an instance of cheating.  
Cheating is different in the need-based transfer framework than in reciprocal 
altruism (Aktipis et al., 2016). There are two possible violations in need-based transfers. 
First, a person with a surplus of resources could be stingy and refuse to give resources to 
someone in need. Second, a person could be greedy and ask for resources when not in 
need. Thus, a potential recipient in a need-based transfer situation would need to 
determine whether the potential giver has enough resources to give without resulting in 
the giver being below the need threshold. Trivers focuses his discussion of cheating on 
the potential for the giver to cheat and does not discuss whether a recipient could also 
cheat. In contrast, the need-based transfer framework suggests that the giver would also 
require cheater-detection mechanisms to assess whether the recipient is in need before 
agreeing to give resources. 
Given the importance of cheater detection for the viability of resource transfer 
mechanisms, it is likely that natural selection would have selected for cognitive 
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mechanisms to detect cheating. To test this hypothesis, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby 
conducted several studies involving the Wason selection task (Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides 
& Tooby, 1992; Cosmides, Barrett, & Tooby, 2010). As its name suggests, the Wason 
selection task was created by Peter Wason (1968) to test people’s deductive reasoning.  
In a Wason selection task, participants are presented with a logical proposition of 
the form “If P, then Q”, where Q is the consequent that must be true if the antecedent is P 
(see Figure 1 for an example of the Wason selection task). After seeing the rule, 
participants are presented with four cards. Participants are told that each of the cards has 
information about the antecedent on one side and information about the consequent on 
the opposite side. However, participants can only see the information on one side of the 
card. One of the cards shows a statement that the antecedent is true (P), another shows a 
statement that the antecedent is false (Not-P), another shows a statement that the 
consequent is true (Q), and another card shows a statement that the consequent is false 
(Not-Q). Each of the cards represents an independent instance in which the rule might or 
might not have been violated. The participants’ task is to decide which of the cards must 
be turned over to determine whether the rule has been violated or not in each of the four 
instances. 
The correct answer for this task is to select the card showing that the antecedent is 
true (P) and the card showing that the consequent is not true (Not-Q). For example, 
suppose that the rule in question is: “If I give Jim my sunglasses, then Jim gives me $40” 
(see Figure 1). In this case, the cards would read: “I gave Jim my sunglasses” (P), “I 
didn’t give Jim my sunglasses” (Not-P), “Jim gave me $40” (Q), and “Jim didn’t give me 
$40” (Not-Q). The cards that tell you whether I gave Jim my sunglasses have information 
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about whether Jim gave me $40 or not on the opposite side. The cards that tell you 
whether Jim gave me $40 or not have information about whether I gave Jim my 
sunglasses on the other side. The question is which of these four cards we must turn over 
to determine whether Jim violated the rule.  
 
Figure 1. Wason selection task example. This figure shows a Wason selection task for 
which the correct answer would be to only turn over the first ("I gave Jim my 
sunglasses") and last ("Jim didn't give me $40") cards. 
 
First, we would need to turn over the P card that says that I gave Jim my 
sunglasses to find out whether Jim paid for the sunglasses he received or not. If Jim paid 
for the sunglasses, then Jim didn’t violate the rule. If Jim didn’t pay for them, then he 
violated the rule. Second, we need to turn over the Not-Q card that says that Jim didn’t 
give me $40 to find out whether Jim got the sunglasses or not. If I didn’t give my 
sunglasses to Jim, then Jim didn’t violate the rule; he didn’t have to pay if he didn’t get 
the sunglasses in the first place. If I gave my sunglasses to Jim, then he violated the rule; 
he was supposed to pay for the sunglasses after he got them and he didn’t.  
The other two cards should not be turned over since they are not necessary for 
determining whether Jim violated the rule. If we know that I didn’t give my sunglasses to 
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Jim (Not-P), then it doesn’t matter whether Jim gave me $40 or not; he didn’t owe me 
anything. If we know that Jim gave me $40, then it doesn’t matter whether I gave Jim my 
sunglasses or not; Jim paid the cost, so there is no way that Jim could have violated the 
rule.  
The original set of experiments that used the Wason selection task involved 
abstract rules involving colors, numbers, shapes, and letters (Wason, 1968). For example, 
one rule was that: “If there is a D on one side of any card, then there is a 3 on its other 
side”. Very few participants provided the correct answer to these rules, which led Wason 
to conclude that people are not very good at solving this type of conditional proposition. 
Following these experiments, the Wason selection task was adapted to test the hypothesis 
that humans possess specialized mechanisms for cheater detection (Cosmides & Tooby, 
1992). 
In a series of studies using the Wason selection task, the researchers presented a 
set of rules to participants that involved the same logic as the original Wason selection 
task (Cosmides, 1989). Although these rules had the same underlying logic as the original 
Wason selection task, they were framed as a situation in which participants had to 
determine whether someone had cheated. Cosmides and Tooby defined cheating in their 
studies as accepting a benefit without paying a cost. Performance in this task increased 
dramatically when it was framed in terms of detecting cheating. For example, in one 
experiment, 75% of participants chose the correct cards for a problem that was framed as 
detecting cheating, while only 21% of participants chose the correct cards for a problem 
that was framed as detecting a violation of a descriptive problem where there was no 
social contract (Cosmides, 1989). 
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Further studies also served to establish that familiarity with the content was not 
responsible for the increase in performance and that logical reasoning in general could 
not account for the results (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Cosmides, Barrett, & Tooby, 
2010). Rather, the researchers concluded that a specialized module for cheater detection 
was responsible for allowing people to identify violations of rules where a cost must be 
paid when a benefit is received. Research has also been conducted to test whether the 
ability to test cheaters is culture-specific. In one study, researchers adapted the Wason 
selection task for use with non-literate Shiwiar participants in the Ecuadorian Amazonia 
(Sugiyama, 2002).  
The researchers working with the Shiwiar knew that the traditional Wason 
selection task would pose problems for non-literate participants given that the task would 
have to be administered verbally instead of in written form. The traditional Wason 
selection task presents all four cards at the same time, but the researchers decided to 
present one card at a time to reduce memory load. In addition, the information about the 
antecedent and consequent were presented in picture form instead of in written form. 
Also, instead of having part of the information on one side of the card and the rest of the 
information on the other side of the card as in a traditional Wason selection task, the 
researchers had both the consequent and the antecedent on a single side of the card and 
covered one of them with a paper door that could be opened to reveal the photo 
underneath. These changes were all made to decrease memory load and make it easier for 
non-literate participants to understand the task. The researchers found that people who 
had little contact with modern Western civilization were also able to detect cheating and 
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performed better on the modified Wason selection task that was framed as a cheater 
detection situation than on one that was framed as a descriptive problem. 
Additional research followed up on the findings by Cosmides and Tooby to 
investigate whether there is a brain area that is involved in this type of processing. In a 
study that tested this prediction, a subject referenced as R.M. with bilateral limbic 
damage to the orbitofrontal cortex, the temporal pole, and the amygdala, was tested on 
two types of Wason selection tasks (Stone, et al., 2002). Even though both tasks involved 
the same exact logic, one type of task was phrased as a cheater detection paradigm and 
the other as a precaution rules paradigm. The results of this experiment indicated that 
R.M.’s damage did not lead to general impairment of problem solving. However, R.M. 
was found to perform significantly worse than two control groups on the cheater 
detection tasks. This second finding suggested that some or all of the regions of R.M.’s 
brain that were damaged might have been responsible for cheater detection. 
The work by Cosmides and Tooby focused on rules that involved paying a cost 
when a benefit is received. For example, one rule that they tested was: “If you give me 
your ostrich eggshell, then I’ll give you duiker meat.” This rule involves the obligation to 
repay a debt that is incurred after receiving a benefit from someone. If we were to place 
the logic of this type of rule within the Aktipis et al. (2016) resource transfer framework, 
we could classify the rules investigated by Cosmides and Tooby as debt-based transfers, 
in which people keep track of the balance of exchanges and expect repayment after 
giving someone a resource.  
The research conducted by Cosmides and Tooby has contributed significantly to 
the field by suggesting that specialized cognitive mechanisms for cheater detection might 
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have developed through natural selection. This work represents the first step in 
identifying the specific cognitive architecture underlying cheater detection. However, as 
Cosmides and Tooby themselves recognized, “we have tested only a small number of 
hypotheses about one mode of social exchange out of many. We have not discussed, 
much less experimentally explored, the rest of the intricate and complex psychology of 
social exchange. Anyone examining his or her own human experience will immediately 
identify large areas of the psychology of social exchange, such as the psychology of 
friendship, that are not captured well by the models introduced so far” (Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1992). Therefore, more work is needed to investigate whether there might be 
multiple specialized cheater detection mechanisms attuned to identify different types of 
cheating. Recent work has built on the work by Cosmides and Tooby and suggested that 
people might have mechanisms for detecting violations of other kinds of rules, such as 
displaying submission to higher status individuals, helping injured allies, and displaying 
coalitional symbols (Sivan, Curry, & Lissa, 2018). 
The recognition that there are different types of cheating led us to conduct a study 
to test whether people have cognitive mechanisms for detecting violations of need-based 
transfer rules (Munoz et al., in prep). Need based transfers can be violated in two ways: 
through greediness and stinginess. Therefore, need-based transfer norms would require 
two detection mechanisms to make need-based transfers a viable mechanism for 
reciprocal altruism. The first detection mechanism would allow the party that receives a 
request for resources (the giver) to detect greediness. The greediness detection rule 
stipulates that the requester should not ask when not in need. The rule to detect 
greediness is: “if not in need, then no request should be made”. The second detection 
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mechanism would allow the party that requests resources (requester) to detect stinginess. 
The stinginess detection rule stipulates that the giver should give in response to a request 
for resources if a surplus of resources is available to the giver. The rule to prevent 
stinginess when the giver receives a request for resources is: “if a surplus of resources is 
available, then give”. 
We conducted a within-subjects study in which all participants viewed four 
different Wason selection tasks (Munoz et al., in prep). In the control task, participants 
were asked to evaluate a descriptive rule with no resource transfers. In the debt-based 
transfer task, based on the work by Cosmides and Tooby, participants were asked to 
detect cheaters who had not paid a debt. The other two tasks involved detecting violations 
of need-based transfer rules. One task asked participants to detect stinginess and the other 
asked participants to detect greediness. We found that performance on the debt-based 
transfer task and on the two need-based transfer tasks was higher than performance on the 
descriptive task (see Figure 2). These results go beyond the findings of previous research 
by suggesting that people have mechanisms for detecting greediness and stinginess in 
addition to having mechanisms for detecting debts not paid.  
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Figure 2. Strict correct responses by type of task (Munoz et al., in prep). More 
participants gave strict correct answers to questions involving debts not paid, greediness, 
and stinginess, than to questions involving rules with no resource transfers. 
 
Situational Factors Might Influence the Likelihood of Activation of Greediness and 
Stinginess Detection Mechanisms 
The research by Munoz et al. suggests that people might have greediness and 
stinginess detection mechanisms, but it does not establish whether these mechanisms are 
attuned to specific situations (in prep). It could be maladaptive for greediness and 
stinginess detection mechanisms to become active when need-based transfer rules are not 
in effect. For example, it would be inefficient to spend resources trying to determine 
whether your transfer partner is in need if you are exchanging oranges for bananas at the 
market and you are using debt-based transfer rules to do so. Need is not a relevant factor 
for debt-based transfers, so it would be wasteful to attend to it in this situation. Therefore, 
it is useful to think about when the rules of need-based transfers would apply in order to 
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To understand when greediness and stinginess detection mechanisms are expected 
to become active, it is necessary to understand why need-based transfers might have been 
selected for. Need-based transfers can increase fitness by serving as an insurance policy 
(Aktipis et al., 2016; Hao et al, 2015; Aktipis, Cronk, & De Aguilar, 2011). Many people 
pay insurance companies in case an unexpected negative event occurs. For example, 
someone might make monthly payments to an insurance company in case their house 
ever catches on fire. The person paying the insurance company hopes that their house 
never catches on fire and therefore, that they never need the insurance company to pay 
them back. Similarly, a person who engages in need-based transfers hopes that they will 
never be in need and therefore, that their partner will never have to pay them back (Cronk 
et al., 2019). If an unexpected event does cause them to be in need, they can rely on their 
need-based transfer network to obtain the necessary resources. Therefore, just like 
insurance companies, need-based transfers can help by alleviating the costs of misfortune 
(Aktipis et al., 2016; Gurven, 2004). The idea of resource transfer networks serving as a 
successful form of social insurance against the risk of unpredictable losses or 
unsuccessful attempts at obtaining a resource has been supported by both modeling and 
empirical data (Aktipis et al., 2011; Aktipis et al., 2016; Cronk et al., 2019; Hames, 1990; 
Hao et al., 2014; Hill, Kaplan, Hawkes, Hurtado, 1987; Kaplan et al., 1985; Pietras, 
Cherek, Lane, Tcheremissine, 2006; Winterhalder, 1986). In fact, research suggests that 
social insurance can be a more successful form of risk reduction than other strategies 
such as dynamic foraging strategy modification (Winterhalder, 1986) and that people in 
different societies around the world successfully rely on social insurance (Cronk et al., 
2019; Hames, 1990; Hill et al., 1987). 
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Although insurance companies are similar in many ways to need-based transfers, 
they are not a perfect analogy (Cronk et al., 2019). First, insurance companies tend to 
insure against very specific types of risks. For instance, an insurance policy for flood 
insurance only covers the risks associated with floods and would not cover the risks 
associated with car accidents. In contrast, need-based transfer networks include coverage 
of a wide range of unpredictable needs that do not need to be fully specified in advance 
(Cronk et al., 2019). Moreover, insurance companies are required to pay in the event of a 
misfortune regardless of whether the recipient is in need or not. A person who has six 
houses and has one of them burn down will still get money from their insurance company 
even though they are not in need. In contrast, need-based transfer partners are not 
obligated to give resources to a recipient who is not in need. Therefore, as the name 
suggests, need-based transfers are expected to occur only for resources that are necessary. 
For example, it is less likely that a need-based transfer would occur when a request for 
ice cream is made than when a request for water is made. 
Research on vampire bats sheds light on another factor that might influence the 
likelihood of activation of need-based transfers: unpredictability of resources. Vampire 
bats feed on blood. Crucially, this species of bats cannot survive more than a couple of 
days without obtaining blood. Vampire bats have been observed to feed blood to hungry 
kin that were unsuccessful at obtaining blood on a particular night (Carter & Wilkinson, 
2015; Wilkinson, 1984). From an evolutionary standpoint, this behavior can be easily 
explained by inclusive fitness. Kin share genes in common, so it would be in the fitness 
interest of an individual to give some of their resources to their hungry kin.  
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However, research suggests that individuals of this species often feed blood to 
non-kin (Carter & Wilkinson, 2015). Researchers find that bats rely on need and previous 
association when deciding whether to transfer blood to non-kin (Carter & Wilkinson, 
2013; Wilkinson, 1984). Vampire bats incur a short-term cost by giving some of their 
food to another bat. However, they might enjoy a long-term fitness gain by expanding 
their risk-pooling network. A vampire bat that obtains a surplus of food might give some 
of their food to needy bats to increase the likelihood that they will receive help if they are 
ever in need. Therefore, these vampire bats appear to be relying on the rules of need-
based transfers to engage in blood transfers with their risk-pooling partners.  
For vampire bats, blood has two characteristics that are important to need-based 
transfers. First, blood is an essential resource. Without blood, a vampire bat will quickly 
starve. Second, blood is an unpredictable resource, such that the success rate of vampires 
at obtaining blood is highly variable. In other words, vampire bats will sometimes be 
unsuccessful at obtaining blood even if they invest substantial energy into trying to do so. 
These two factors combined would make it so that even bats with perfect work ethic 
would sometimes starve to death. To prevent this, bats have developed need-based 
transfer mechanisms for sharing food with other bats and developing risk-pooling 
networks.  
The same logic that applies to vampire bats can be applied to humans. People are 
likely to have developed need-based transfer mechanisms that are especially attuned to 
resources that are both necessary and unpredictable. For example, it might be more likely 
for the rules of need-based transfers to become active when people are transferring water 
during a camping trip than when people are transferring ice cream at a restaurant. 
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Greediness and stinginess detection mechanisms should be most likely to become active 
when need-based transfers are likely to take place to allow people to detect cheating that 
is relevant to the rules that are in place in a given situation. Therefore, greediness and 
stinginess detection should also be most likely to become active when people are 
transferring resources that are necessary and unpredictable (see Figure 3 for hypothesis). 
The experiment described in the methods section aims to test this prediction. 
 
Figure 3. Predictions about activation of greediness and stinginess detection mechanisms 
based on resource necessity and unpredictability. I expected the highest likelihood of 
activation of greediness and stinginess detection mechanisms for resources that were high 
on both necessity and unpredictability. 




The task was displayed on a computer to 184 Amazon Mechanical Turk 
participants who agreed to participate in the study. Participants were recruited to 
participate through a listing on Amazon Mechanical Turk that asked MTurk workers to 
participate in a study about rule violations. Out of the participants who agreed to 
participate, 32 participants did not complete the study and their data were excluded from 
the analyses, which brought the number of participants who completed the study to 152. 
Of these participants, 96 were male and 56 were female. The average age of the 
participants was 36.26 years old. Participants were paid eighty cents for participating in 
the study. 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants who were interested in participating in the study after reading the 
listing on Amazon Mechanical Turk were asked to click on a link that redirected them to 
the study on Qualtrics. Once participants opened the link on Qualtrics, they read some 
general information about the study and checked a box to confirm that they were at least 
eighteen years old and to consent to participating in the study. Then, they saw 
instructions asking them to imagine that they live on an island where there are coconuts. 
For this experiment, participants saw one of four versions of the instructions, depending 
on which condition they were randomly assigned to. In one version of the instructions, 
participants were given a paragraph suggesting that coconut water was both necessary for 
survival and another paragraph suggesting that coconut water was a predictable resource. 
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In another version, they were told that coconut water was necessary for survival and that 
it was unpredictable. The third version of the instructions told participants that coconut 
water was not necessary for survival and that it was predictable. Finally, the last version 
of the instructions told participants that coconut water is not necessary for survival and 
that it was unpredictable. The order in which the paragraph suggesting the level of 
necessity of coconut water and the paragraph suggesting the level of unpredictability of 
coconut water were presented was randomized, such that some participants saw the 
information about the level of necessity of coconut water first and some participants saw 
the information about the level of unpredictability of coconut water first. 
Version of the instructions that suggests that coconut water is necessary for survival: 
“Coconut water is the only drinkable liquid available on the island. There are several 
ponds around the island, but they all contain dirty toxic water that is not safe to drink. In 
fact, you have a neighbor who died after drinking water from the ponds. Therefore, 
coconut water is essential for survival on the island.” 
Version of the instructions that suggests that coconut water is not necessary for survival: 
“People on the island can choose to drink fresh water instead of drinking coconut water. 
There are several ponds around the island that contain plenty of fresh water that is safe to 
drink. In fact, you have a neighbor who doesn't gather coconuts. Instead, he has been 
drinking water from the ponds exclusively throughout his entire life and it has kept him 
in perfect health. Coconut water is valued because it tastes better than water from the 
ponds, but it is not necessary for survival.” 
Version of the instructions that suggests that coconut water is predictable: “All of the 
coconuts on the island contain plenty of water inside. This means that people who go out 
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to gather coconut water always come back with plenty of coconut water. In fact, you have 
a neighbor who has gathered a surplus of coconut water every day for the past 40 years.” 
Version of the instructions that suggests that coconut water is unpredictable: “Most of the 
coconuts on the island have no water inside. This means that people who go out to gather 
coconut water might get unlucky and get only dry coconuts with no water inside. In fact, 
you have a neighbor who came home with many coconuts every day, but for an entire 
week all of his coconuts were dry.” 
 After reading these initial instructions, participants read another set of instructions 
explaining the task. Then, they were presented with four rules, one at a time (See Figures 
4-7). The order in which the rules were presented was randomized for each participant. 
Three of the rules were framed in terms of detecting a violation of a rule about 
transferring resources. One of these rules was about detecting stinginess, another about 
detecting greediness, and another about detecting an outstanding debt. The fourth rule 
was a descriptive rule that didn’t involve any type of social contract about resource 
transfers. Instead, it was about detecting a logical violation of a rule about finding a 
resource when another resource has been found.  
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Figure 4. Stinginess detection rule. This figure shows the stinginess detection rule for the 




Figure 5. Greediness detection rule. This figure shows the greediness detection rule for 
the cheater detection task developed by Munoz et al. (in prep). 
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Figure 6. Outstanding debt detection rule. This figure shows the outstanding debt 
detection rule for the cheater detection task developed by Munoz et al. (in prep). 
 
Figure 7. Descriptive rule. This figure shows the descriptive rule for the cheater detection 
task developed by Munoz et al. (in prep). 
After seeing each rule, participants saw four different questions relating to that 
rule, one at a time. Each question asked whether the rule could have been violated or not 
on each of four days. Participants were given one fact for each of the days that provided 
some information about what happened on that day. The facts given for each day 
corresponded to one of four possible logical propositions for each rule. That is, one fact 
stated that the antecedent, or the first part of the logical proposition, was true on that day 
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(P). Another fact stated that the antecedent was false on that day (Not-P). A third fact 
stated that the consequent, or the second part of the logical proposition, was true on that 
day (Q). Finally, a fourth fact stated that the consequent was false on that day (Not-Q). 
The order in which each fact was presented was randomized for each participant. From a 
logical standpoint, questions about whether the rule could have been violated that involve 
P and Not-Q should be answered as “yes, it’s possible”, while questions involving Not-P 
and Q should be answered “no, it’s not possible”. 
Figures 8 and 9 are examples of the questions that were presented to participants. 
Figure 8 shows the P statement for the stinginess detection rule (true antecedent). The 
correct answer for this question would be to select “yes, it’s possible” since it is possible 
that Chris could have been stingy by refusing to give even though he had a surplus of 
coconut water. Figure 9 shows the Q statement for the greediness detection rule (true 
consequent). The correct answer for this question would be to select “no, it’s not 
possible” since Chris did not ask for coconut water and therefore, was not greedy. 
 
Figure 8. P statement for stinginess detection rule. This figure shows the P statement for 
the stinginess detection rule for the cheater detection task developed by Munoz et al. (in 
prep). 
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Figure 9. Q statement for the greediness detection rule. This figure shows the Q 
statement for the greediness detection rule for the cheater detection task developed by 
Munoz et al. (in prep). 
After participants finished answering all four questions for all four types of rules, 
they were presented with a question that was meant to serve as an attention check. This 
question told participants that research has shown that participants sometimes skip the 
instructions and then asked them to choose the last option out of six multiple choice 
options to show that they were paying attention, regardless of what the question below 
those instructions was asking. These instructions were followed by a question asking 
what the study had been about. The last option, which was the correct answer, had 
nothing to do with the actual study and read: “Issues about geography”.  
Then, participants saw two questions that were intended as a manipulation check. 
One of these questions posed a statement about coconut water being necessary for 
survival on the island and the other posed a statement about the acquisition of coconut 
water being predictable on the island. The participants were asked whether these 
statements were true and had to answer by selecting “True” or “False”. The correct 
answer to these questions depended on which type of resource condition the participants 
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had been randomly assigned to. For example, a participant who was assigned to the high 
necessity and high unpredictability condition, and who read and understood the 
instructions, should have answered “true” to the statement about coconut water being 
necessary and “false” to the statement about coconut water being predictable. After 
answering the manipulation check questions, participants saw a message thanking them 
for participating in the study.  
This study used the cheater detection task (see Figures 4-9) developed by Munoz 
et al. (in prep). The literature on cheater detection has relied almost entirely on the Wason 
selection task (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). The Wason selection task provides strong 
evidence for the existence of cheater detection mechanisms and it might seem like the 
obvious choice for conducting research on cheater detection given its monopoly of the 
cheater detection literature. However, relying on a single task for testing a theoretical 
framework can make conclusions about that framework vulnerable to biases and 
idiosyncrasies inherent in the task. The best evidence for a theory can be obtained by 
using different methodologies and comparing the results to rule out the possibility that 
any specific feature of the methodology produced the results.  
The Wason selection task and the Munoz et al. detection task both present 
participants with a rule that could be violated, give participants a piece of information 
that is known, and then ask a question. However, the question asked by each of these 
tasks is different. The Munoz et al. detection task asks whether the rule could have been 
violated or not given a piece of information that is known. This is different from the 
Wason selection task, which asks whether more information is needed to determine 
whether the rule was violated or not. Therefore, the Munoz et al. detection task more 
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directly tests if people can determine whether cheating could have occurred given limited 
information, rather than whether people are good at knowing when to seek or avoid 
seeking additional information to determine whether cheating could have occurred.  
One of the useful features of the Munoz et al. detection task is that, unlike the 
Wason selection task, it avoids confounding curiosity with incorrect responses. In the 
Wason selection task, people are presented with four cards, each of which has part of the 
information on one side of the card and part of the information on the other side of the 
card. A correct response involves selecting two of the cards and not selecting the other 
two cards. However, participants might select incorrect cards because they are curious to 
see what is on the other side of the card. In other words, curiosity and the inability to 
correctly detect cheating are confounded in the Wason selection task. As opposed to the 
Wason selection task, the Munoz et al. detection task avoids confounding incorrect 
responses with curiosity because it doesn’t have any hidden information.  
Moreover, the new methodology is simpler than the Wason selection task (see 
Figures 4-9). The Wason selection task includes long paragraphs of background 
information about the rules. These background information paragraphs are often different 
from one another in many ways between conditions. This could potentially introduce 
confounds and error. The simpler and more visual nature of the new cheater detection 
task developed by Munoz et al. also allows for simpler modification to test specific 
hypotheses, as well as for easier translation for field work (in prep). The task also 
involves less cognitive load, which would make it easier to implement with non-literate 
participants. This would allow future work to test whether the same kinds of resources 
are likely to activate greediness and stinginess detection across different societies. 




There were two independent variables that were considered in this study. The first 
independent variable of interest was the type of resource. Participants were all asked to 
imagine that they lived on an island where there is coconut water. However, the 
information that participants got about coconut water depended on the condition that they 
were randomly assigned to. Participants were given information about two features of 
coconut water on the island: necessity, or the degree to which coconut water was 
essential for survival, and unpredictability, or the degree to which randomness played a 
role in the acquisition of coconut water. Participants were given information suggesting 
one of the following combinations of features for coconut water on the island: necessary 
and unpredictable, necessary and predictable, not necessary and unpredictable, or not 
necessary and predictable. The second independent variable of interest was the type of 
rule. Each participant saw four types of rules, each of which presented a different type of 
potential violation: greediness, stinginess, unpaid debt, and a violation of a descriptive 
rule. 
The dependent variable of interest was people’s ability to detect different types of 
violations. Ability to detect a violation was operationalized in terms of strict correct 
responses. Each of the four rules that participants saw had four questions associated with 
it. The questions gave participants information stating that the antecedent was true, that 
the antecedent was false, that the consequent was true, or that the consequent was false 
and asked whether a violation of the rule could have occurred. A strict correct response 
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for each of these rules involved a participant answering all four questions associated with 
the rule correctly. If a participant answered one or more of these questions incorrectly, it 
was counted as an incorrect response for that rule. 
I expected that resource necessity and unpredictability would increase the 
likelihood of activation of stinginess and greediness detection mechanisms. Specifically, I 
predicted a larger proportion of strict correct responses for participants who were told 
that coconut water was both necessary and unpredictable for questions framed as 
detecting stinginess and greediness, but not for questions framed as detecting outstanding 
debts or violations of descriptive rules, than for participants who received any of the 
other three combinations of features for coconut water (see Figure 3). 
The dependent variable of strict correct responses is binary: correct or incorrect. 
The first independent variable, type of resource, was a between-subjects variable. In 
contrast, the second variable of interest, type of rule, was a within-subject variable 
because all participants saw all four types of rules. Thus, I chose generalized estimating 
equations with a binary logistic model to test my hypothesis. Before conducting my 
analyses, I removed participants who failed an attention-check. The attention-check asked 
participants to select the last option in a multiple-choice question to demonstrate that they 
were reading the instructions. Eleven participants failed this attention check, which 
resulted in a total number of 141 participants included in the analyses. I did not remove 
from the analyses any participants based on failing either of the two manipulation check 
questions that were presented at the end of the study. 
Goodness of Fit 
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Before looking at the significance of the main effects and interaction of resource 
type and rule type on strict correct responses, it’s important to consider correlation matrix 
structures and model fit. One index that gives insight into model fit is the QIC score 
(Quasi-likelihood under Independence Model Criterion). The QIC score allows for a 
comparison between different models, such that the smaller the QIC for a model, the 
better the fit.  
First, I ran a model with only a main effect for rule type. The correlation matrix 
structure for rule type did not influence the QIC score, which was 669.83. Then, I ran a 
model with only a main effect for resource type. The QIC score was affected by the 
correlation matrix structure. I tested three potential correlation matrix structures that are 
common for this type of data: unstructured, which assumes there is no pattern in the 
correlation matrix, independent, which assumes the correlations are zero, and 
exchangeable, which estimates a single correlation for all cells in the matrix and assumes 
that all correlations are equal. The independent and exchangeable correlation matrix 
structures produced the same QIC score of 725.60, which suggested a better fit than the 
729.31 QIC score for the unstructured correlation matrix structure. Interestingly, these 
QIC scores for the model with only a main effect for resource type are greater than the 
QIC score for the model with only a main effect for rule type. This suggests that the type 
of rule is more likely to have an effect on strict correct responses than the type of 
resource. 
Next, I turned my attention to a model with the two main effects, but without the 
interaction effect. Although an unstructured correlation matrix structure produced the 
best fit, the QIC score changed less than one point no matter the correlation matrix 
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structure that was used. Therefore, there is no strong evidence for a matrix structure 
fitting the data better than the others. Given that the unstructured correlation matrix 
structure produced the best fit, even if by a narrow margin, and that it is the most general 
structure, I chose this correlation matrix structure for my analyses. The model with the 
two main effects, without the interaction effect, and with an unstructured correlation 
matrix structure, produced a QIC score of 677.82. This QIC score is greater than the QIC 
score of the model with only a main effect of resource type, but smaller than the QIC 
score of the model with only a main effect of rule type. These differences in QIC scores 
suggest that the addition of the main effect of resource type is detrimental to model fit. 
My hypothesis that resource type would affect the activation of greediness and stinginess 
detection mechanisms requires that there be an effect of resource type on strict correct 
scores, so this analysis of goodness of fit does not support my hypothesis. 
I also ran a model that included a main effect of resource type, a main effect of 
rule type, and an interaction effect between these two variables with an unstructured 
correlation matrix structure. This model produced a QIC score of 685.59. I tested 
different correlation matrix structures to see whether they would produce better goodness 
of fit scores, but the goodness of fit did not change with different correlation matrix 
structures. The QIC for the model with only the two main effects was 677.82, which is 
smaller than the QIC score of 685.59 produced by the model that included the interaction 
effect. Smaller QIC scores suggest better fit, which means that the model without the 
interaction effect seems to fit the data better. My hypothesis that the combination of a 
resource being necessary and unpredictable would lead to the highest performance on 
questions for rules framed as detecting stinginess and greediness, but not on questions for 
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rules framed as detecting outstanding debts or violations of descriptive rules, necessitates 
that there be an interaction between the type of resource and the type of rule. Thus, the 
better fit suggested by the smaller QIC score for the model without the interaction effect 
is not consistent with my hypothesis.  
Significance Testing 
After looking at the goodness of fit indicators for the models, I ran the model with 
the main effect for rule type, the main effect for resource type, and the interaction effect 
to test for significance. The correlation matrix structure did not affect the goodness of fit 
for this model, so I used an unstructured correlation matrix structure, which is the most 
general structure. I predicted a larger proportion of strict correct responses for 
participants who were told that coconut water was both necessary and unpredictable for 
questions framed as detecting stinginess and greediness, but not for questions framed as 
detecting outstanding debts or violations of descriptive rules, than for participants who 
received any of the other three combinations of features for coconut water (see Figure 3). 
The results that would support this hypothesis would be to find a significant interaction 
between question type and resource type. However, the results suggested that this 
interaction was not significant; Χ²(9)=10.24, p>.05 (see Figure 10). Thus, my hypothesis 
was not supported.  
Aside from my main hypothesis, I expected to find results consistent with my 
previous findings that participants are better able to detect stinginess, greediness, and 
outstanding debt violations than violations of descriptive rules (Munoz et al., in prep). 
The results revealed that the main effect for resource type was not significant; 
Χ²(3)=0.51, p>.05 (see Figure 11). In contrast, the main effect for rule type was 
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significant; Χ²(3)=34.68, p<.001 (see Figure 12). These results suggest that cheater 
detection ability was not influenced by the features that were assigned to coconut water, 
but it was influenced by the type of violation that participants were asked to detect.  
The significant main effect for rule type provides some evidence to support my 
previous findings. However, further analyses are needed to determine which rules elicited 
the best performance. Thus, I ran pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustments and 
found that the proportion of strict correct responses for greediness detection (47%, 
p<.001), stinginess detection (61%, p<.001), and detection of outstanding debts (63%, 
p<.001) were all higher than strict correct responses for detection of descriptive rule 
violations (15%); Χ²(3)=54.57, p<.001. These results are consistent with my previous 
research suggesting that people might have cognitive mechanisms for detecting 
greediness, stinginess, and outstanding debts (Munoz et al., in prep). I also found that 
there were no significant differences in strict correct responses between greediness, 
stinginess, and outstanding debt detection rules, which suggests that these three cheater 
detection mechanisms are similarly effective. 
I also looked at the odds ratios while holding resource type constant to gain 
further insight into the main effect of rule type. The odds of a strict correct response was 
6.79 higher given a rule about outstanding debt compared to a descriptive rule. The odds 
of a strict correct response was 4.20 higher given a rule about greediness compared to a 
descriptive rule. Finally, the odds of a strict correct response was 6.41 higher given a rule 
about stinginess compared to a descriptive rule. These odds ratios suggest that 
participants were better able to detect violations regarding outstanding debts, greediness, 
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and stinginess than violations about descriptive rules, which is consistent with my 
previous research (Munoz et al., in prep).   
 
Figure 10. Percent of participants that achieved a strict correct response by type of 




Figure 11. Percent of participants that achieved a strict correct response by type of 
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Figure 12. Percent of participants that achieved a strict correct response by type of rule. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
The results showed that people performed better on stinginess, greediness, and 
outstanding debt detection than on detection of descriptive rule violations. This finding is 
consistent with my previous studies, which suggest that people might have cognitive 
mechanisms for detecting stinginess and greediness in addition outstanding debts (Munoz 
et al., in prep). However, the results did not support my hypothesis that resource type 
would have an effect on stinginess and greediness detection, such that a combination of 
high resource necessity and unpredictability would result in the highest performance for 
detecting greediness and stinginess, but not for detecting outstanding debts and violations 
of descriptive rules. Below I outline several explanations for why the results were not 
consistent with my hypothesis and I provide some directions for future research. 
Benefits of Detection Even When Resources are Not Necessary and Unpredictable 
One possibility for the lack of support of my hypothesis is that the benefits of 
monitoring for need-based transfer behavior sometimes outweigh the costs even in 
situations in which need-based transfer rules are unlikely to apply. Detecting violations of 
need-based transfer rules in situations in which need-based transfers don’t apply might 
provide useful information about the relationship. For example, if you find that an 
acquaintance is behaving in a need-based transfer manner, even if need-based transfers 
are not required, it might signal a willingness to become need-based transfer partners and 
help to build trust before establishing a relationship in which need-based transfers for 
necessary and unpredictable resources can take place.  
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Imagine that an acquaintance offers you some of their chocolate while you’re at 
the movies. Chocolate is not a necessary resource and it’s not unpredictable; your 
survival won’t be impacted if you don’t eat chocolate and you can reliably buy it from the 
concession stand. Nonetheless, you might still ask for some chocolate from your 
acquaintance. If your acquaintance agrees to share some of their chocolate, this might 
serve as a way of building trust. Future studies should test whether the type of 
relationship that exists (friend, kin, acquaintance, stranger, etc.) with the person involved 
in a resource transfer — or the potential for a certain type of relationship — impacts the 
likelihood that different types of cheater detection mechanisms become active given 
different types of resources.   
Future studies should also consider how information about violations of rules can 
be used in different ways. In some instances, information about violations can serve to 
punish cheaters. In other instances, information about violations can serve to update our 
estimation of other people’s valuation of us and inform our decisions about how to invest 
our attention and resources. To tease apart these two functions of cheater detection 
mechanisms, it would be interesting to look at people’s behaviors after detecting a 
violation of need-based transfer rules. In particular, it would be useful to find out whether 
people who detect greediness and stinginess for necessary and unpredictable resources 
are more likely to punish or stop interacting with the rule breaker than people who detect 
greediness and stinginess for resources that are not necessary and unpredictable. These 
findings would indicate that people gather information about adherence to need-based 
transfer rules regardless of the type of resource being transferred, but they act differently 
towards a target who violated the rules depending on the type of resource involved. 
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Conscious Control Over Cheater Detection Mechanisms  
Another explanation for the results of this study is that people can consciously 
activate their cheater detection mechanisms, even in situations that would not normally 
be likely to trigger them. In this study, participants were explicitly asked whether a 
violation could have occurred, regardless of the type of resource in question. Therefore, if 
executive control over cheater detection mechanisms is possible, people would have been 
able to exert executive control to activate their stinginess and greediness detection 
mechanisms in response to the study’s request to detect potential violations. If this is the 
case, we might expect to see that rates of activation of greediness and stinginess detection 
mechanisms depend on the type of resource in natural settings in which people are not 
explicitly asked to detect violations. Natural selection might have shaped these 
mechanisms to be on auto-pilot most of the time to reduce cognitive load. However, 
natural selection might have also allowed us to maintain the ability to exert conscious 
control over cheater detection mechanisms in case an unusual circumstance arises that 
requires us to do so. This would be comparable to our ability to exert conscious control 
over our breathing, even though it is usually an automatic process. 
Imperfect Manipulation 
 Something else that should be considered when interpreting these results is that 
conflicting information might have been inadvertently provided to participants. 
Specifically, participants in the low necessity conditions were told that coconut water was 
not essential for survival at the beginning of the experiment. However, when these same 
participants were presented with stinginess and greediness rules, they were given 
information that implied that not having enough coconut water was a possibility. The 
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stinginess rule was: “If Chris has more coconut water than he needs, then Chris gives you 
some coconut water”. The greediness rule was: “If Chris has enough coconut water, then 
Chris doesn’t ask you for coconut water”. These rules could have conveyed to 
participants that coconut water was a resource that was necessary for survival by 
implying that there is some threshold of need for coconut water (stinginess rule) and that 
sometimes people don’t have enough coconut water (greediness rule).  
The message that the stinginess rule aimed to convey by suggesting that Chris 
might have had more coconut water than he needed was that people can sometimes obtain 
a surplus of coconut water, such that they would have more coconut water than they 
could consume by themselves. The greediness rule was meant to convey that that people 
can sometimes have less coconut water than they would like. However, the wording for 
these two rules might not have been optimal for communicating the desired messages and 
might have instead led to some confusion. Thus, participants in the low necessity 
conditions might have been forced to choose whether to believe the instructions that 
specified that coconut water was not necessary for survival or the potential implications 
of the stinginess and greediness rules that coconut water was necessary for survival.  
I included two questions at the end of the study that might shed some light into 
the effectiveness of the manipulation, which attempted to influence people’s perceptions 
about the necessity and unpredictability of coconut water. Moreover, these questions can 
help to examine whether there was confusion about whether coconut water was necessary 
in the low necessity condition. One of the questions at the end of the study gave a 
statement about coconut water being necessary on the island and asked participants 
whether this was true. The other question gave a statement about the acquisition of 
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coconut water on the island being predictable and asked participants if this was true. 
Participants had to answer either “true” or “false” to each of these questions. Participants 
were randomly assigned to four conditions that varied in terms of whether the 
instructions suggested that coconut water on the island was necessary (or not necessary) 
and unpredictable (or predictable). Therefore, the correct answer to these two questions at 
the end of the study varied by condition. For example, a participant who was assigned to 
the high necessity and high unpredictability condition, and who read and understood the 
instructions, should have answered “true” to the statement about coconut water being 
necessary and “false” to the statement about coconut water being predictable.  
The results of these two questions at the end of the study show that, out of the 141 
participants who passed the attention check, sixteen (11.35%) failed at least one of the 
manipulation checks. Two failed only the need manipulation check, ten failed only the 
predictability manipulation check, and four failed both manipulation checks. All six 
participants who failed the necessity manipulation check were in one of the two low 
necessity conditions. In other words, 9.4% of participants in the low necessity conditions 
failed the necessity manipulation check. However, most of the participants (four out of 
six participants) who failed the necessity condition also failed the predictability 
condition. This suggests that most of the participants who failed the necessity 
manipulation check might not have read the instructions carefully, which might have led 
them to fail both manipulation checks. If we consider the participants who failed the 
necessity manipulation check, but not the predictability manipulation check, this accounts 
for only 3.13% of participants (2 participants) in the low necessity conditions. Still, this is 
higher than the 0 participants who failed the necessity manipulation check in the high 
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necessity condition. Thus, there does seem to be some evidence for confusion about the 
necessity of coconut water in the low necessity conditions. Future studies that look at the 
effect of type of resource on stinginess and greediness detection should use language for 
the stinginess and greediness rules that does not suggest that a resource might be 
necessary for survival.  
Another explanation for the lack of an effect of resource type on the activation of 
greediness and stinginess detection is that the manipulation might not have been strong 
enough. In this study, participants were asked to imagine that they live in an island where 
there is coconut water. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four different 
conditions. Each condition gave participants different information about whether coconut 
water was necessary and/or unpredictable. However, participants might have already had 
preconceptions about how unpredictable and necessary coconut water is. These 
preconceptions, which would stem from their own life experiences, might have been 
stronger than the manipulation. If this was the case, differences in greediness and 
stinginess detection activation by type of resource might exist, but they might not have 
been adequately captured by this study.  
One way of testing whether the manipulation was inadequate would be to conduct 
a study in which the resources in each condition are selected to fit different levels of 
necessity and unpredictability as they are perceived in the participants’ real environment. 
This method would allow less control of extraneous variables between conditions, but it 
might be more effective than trying to push around participants’ perceptions of a resource 
through story-telling. For example, water could be used as a predictable and necessary 
resource for participants living in much of the United States. The problem with this 
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approach might be that many participants in wealthy industrialized nations might not 
perceive any resource to be both necessary and unpredictable. An alternative approach 
might be to ask participants to imagine that they live on an island and then presenting 
them with a resource that they’re unfamiliar with. Presenting a resource that is 
unfamiliar, as opposed to a familiar resource such as coconut water, would avoid 
triggering preconceptions that participants might have about the resource in question and 
thus, it might allow for a more effective manipulation of the characteristics of the 
resource across conditions. 
Measuring Level of Suspicion 
Future studies should also consider that in the real world, information is often 
incomplete or inaccurate. In this study, participants were given facts to help them decide 
whether a violation of a rule could have been possible or not. For example, one of the 
questions told participants that “Chris had enough coconut water on this day”. However, 
in the real world, Chris could have been hiding his coconut water. Therefore, cognitive 
mechanisms are likely to be designed to be skeptical even when presented with evidence 
of something being true. The binary decision given to participants between selecting that 
“yes, it’s possible” that Chris violated the rule and “no, it’s not possible” that Chris 
violated the rule does not adequately measure the level of suspicion that participants 
might have towards Chris given a specific situation. A more sensitive measure of 
suspicion level might be to ask participants to rate on a Likert scale the extent to which it 
is possible that Chris could have violated the rule. It’s possible that a study employing 
this dependent variable might find that the level of suspicion of Chris for stinginess and 
greediness rules is higher for resources that are necessary and unpredictable than for 
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other types of resources.  
Concluding Remarks 
My hypothesis that resource type would have an effect on the activation of greediness 
and stinginess detection was not supported by the results of this study. There are several 
potential explanations for this lack of support. One option is that the benefits of 
monitoring for need-based transfer behavior sometimes outweigh the costs even in 
situations in which need-based transfer rules are unlikely to apply. Another explanation is 
that participants were able to exert conscious control over their stinginess and greediness 
detection mechanisms to activate them, even for resources that would not naturally 
trigger them in the real world. It’s also possible that the results reflect a problem with the 
manipulation. More research is needed to determine which of these explanations, or what 
combination of these explanations, best accounts for the results of this study. Further 
research into what conditions trigger stinginess and greediness detection can help us to 
understand an important piece of the puzzle that is our ability to cooperate and trust each 
other. Resource transfers made through need-based transfers make us vulnerable to 
cheating, but thanks to greediness and stinginess detection, we can reap the benefits of 
this human behavior while often avoiding exploitation. These cognitive defenses make it 
possible to both give some of your water to a thirsty camper and to keep your delicious 
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To gain further insight, I considered a different measurement for my dependent 
variable. My planned results used strict correct responses as my dependent variable. A 
strict correct response is only counted as correct if all four questions, corresponding to 
the four possible logical propositions for a rule (P, Q, Not-P, and Not-Q) are all answered 
correctly. This dependent variable provides the best evidence for cheater detection 
mechanisms because it is incredibly unlikely that someone would be able to answer all 
four questions correctly by chance alone. I decided to consider a less stringent dependent 
variable in an exploratory test to determine whether resource type might have an effect on 
cheater detection ability. To do this, I created a new dependent variable, which I called 
“cumulative correct”. This variable was computed by adding the number of correct 
responses out of the four possible questions for each given rule. For example, if a 
participant got the P, Q, Not-P, and Not-Q questions correct for a greediness detection 
rule, this participant was assigned a cumulative correct score of 4 for that rule. If the 
same participant got only the P and Q cards correct for the stinginess detection rule, this 
participant was assigned a cumulative correct score of 2 for that rule. Thus, the scores for 
the cumulative correct variable ranged from 0 to 4. 
Then, I used generalized estimating equations with a model that included a main 
effect of resource type, a main effect of rule type, and an interaction effect of resource 
type and rule type with cumulative correct as my dependent variable. Cumulative correct 
is a count variable, so I used a Poisson loglinear model. The main effect of resource type 
was not significant; Χ²(3)=0.80, p>.05. The main effect of rule type was significant; 
Χ²(3)=70.13, p<.05. Thus, the significance of the main effects remained the same 
regardless of whether a cumulative correct dependent variable or a strict correct 
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dependent variable was used. The interaction between rule type and resource type was 
significant for the model with the cumulative correct dependent variable; Χ²(9)=17.17, 
p<.05. This result contrasts with the model with the strict correct dependent variable, 
which did not show a significant interaction between rule type and resource type.  
I ran pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustments for the interaction effect 
between rule type and resource type to explore this significant interaction in more detail. 
A few interesting findings emerged from these pairwise comparisons. First, there were no 
differences between resource types when comparing within the same rule type. For 
example, there was no significant difference between cumulative correct responses when 
comparing a high necessity high unpredictability resource with a low necessity low 
unpredictability resource for the stinginess detection rule. These results suggest that the 
resource type did not affect the activation of cheater detection mechanisms, which does 
not support my hypothesis that greediness and stinginess detection performance would be 
higher for high necessity/high unpredictability resources than for the other resource types. 
The pairwise comparisons also suggested that the stinginess detection rule (High 
Necessity/High Unpredictability: 78.85%, p<.001; High Necessity/Low Unpredictability: 
77.63%, p<.01; Low Necessity/High Unpredictability: 75%, p<.01; Low Necessity/Low 
Unpredictability: 75.71%, p<.01) had a higher proportion of cumulative correct responses 
than the descriptive rule (High Necessity/High Unpredictability: 56.41%, High 
Necessity/Low Unpredictability: 51.32%, Low Necessity/High Unpredictability: 50.86%, 
Low Necessity/Low Unpredictability: 49.29%) for all resource types; Χ²(15)=120.72, 
p<.001. This finding suggests that stinginess detection mechanisms can be activated 
regardless of the type of resource involved, which does not support my hypothesis. A 
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similar pattern emerged with outstanding debt detection. Outstanding debt detection 
(High Necessity/High Unpredictability: 80.77%, p<.001; High Necessity/Low 
Unpredictability: 73.68%, p>.05; Low Necessity/High Unpredictability: 73.28%, p<.05; 
Low Necessity/Low Unpredictability: 74.29%; p<.05) had a higher proportion of 
cumulative correct responses than the descriptive rule for all resource types, except for 
the high necessity/low unpredictability condition.  
More relevant to my hypothesis, the proportion of cumulative correct responses 
for the greediness detection rule (59.62%) was significantly lower than the proportion of 
cumulative correct responses for both the stinginess detection rule (78.85%, p<.01) and 
the outstanding debt detection rule (80.77%, p<.01) and was not higher than the 
proportion of cumulative correct responses for the descriptive rule (56.41%) for the high 
necessity/high unpredictability resource condition. The proportion of cumulative correct 
responses for the greediness detection rule was not significantly different from the 
stinginess and outstanding debt detection rules for any of the other resource conditions. 
These results are contrary to my hypothesis since I expected that greediness detection 
performance would be best for resources that are highly necessary and unpredictable. 
Although not expected, this result could be explained in two different ways.  
The first explanation, which I will refer to as the relationship maintenance 
explanation, assumes that participants believed Chris, the fictitious person in the 
experiment that was presented in the questions, to be highly interdependent with them. 
Participants were not given any specific information about who Chris was or what their 
relationship to Chris might have been. However, participants might have inferred that 
Chris was another person on the island with whom they were interdependent. Participants 
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were asked to imagine that they were in a primitive island where resources couldn’t be 
accessed by going to a supermarket, but instead had to be gathered. Our participants 
might have inferred that being in such an unfamiliar environment required them to be 
interdependent with others on the island, such as Chris.  
 People in the real world often have incomplete or incorrect information. 
Therefore, it is possible to wrongfully accuse someone of being greedy. A person might 
accuse someone of being greedy only to find out later that the accused didn’t have 
enough resources to sustain themselves. Wrongfully accusing someone of being greedy 
could damage a relationship that is essential. Moreover, denying someone essential 
resources when they are in need can be severely detrimental even beyond damaging the 
relationship when positive fitness interdependence is high. By denying them resources, a 
person that you depend on could become weak or even perish without your aid. 
Therefore, greediness detection of essential resources when fitness interdependence is 
high would likely pose risks that are higher than the protective benefits it can bestow. 
Given these high risks, people in these situations might suppress greediness detection and 
instead rely on an estimation of fitness interdependence to decide whether to give 
resources. 
A second explanation for the results, which I will call the suspicion explanation, 
involves a high activation of greediness detection mechanisms when the resource 
involved is necessary and unpredictable. This high activation, which would be consistent 
with my hypothesis, could lead participants to be highly suspicious of Chris and of the 
information provided about Chris. For example, when told that “Chris didn’t have enough 
coconut water on this day”, participants might have been suspicious of that information 
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and thought that Chris might be hiding some of his coconut water. Similarly, when told 
that “Chris didn’t ask you for coconut water on this day”, participants might have thought 
that maybe Chris was not explicitly asking for coconut water, but he was implying that he 
wanted some in other ways. If participants were highly suspicious of Chris, they might 
have preferred not to select the option that said that “No, it’s not possible” that Chris 
violated the rule even if the evidence suggested that this was the case. 
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A strict correct response involves responding correctly to all four logical 
propositions for a rule (P, Q, Not-P, and Not-Q). Thus, strict correct responses evaluate 
whether people can both correctly identify situations in which a violation could have 
occurred (P and Not-Q) and correctly avoid suspecting a violation when a violation is 
impossible (Not-P and Q). However, you could consider these two situations separately 
to determine whether each detection mechanism performed better in one of these domains 
than in the other.  
This detection theory approach is often used for evaluating medical diagnosis 
instrumentation, but it can be applied to other domains as well (Parikh, Mathai, Parikh, 
Chandra Sekhar, & Thomas, 2008). This approach involves classifying responses as true 
positives, true negatives, false positives, and false negatives. Responses labeled as “true” 
mean that the participant gave a correct response, while responses labeled as “false” 
mean that the participant gave an incorrect response. Responses given for situations 
labeled as “positive” mean that a violation was possible in that situation (P and Not-Q), 
while the label “negative” means that a violation was not possible in that situation (Q and 
Not-P).  
A true positive is a situation in which a violation of the rule could have occurred, 
and the participant correctly identifies that a violation is possible. A true negative is a 
situation in which a violation of the rule is not possible, and the participant correctly 
identifies that a violation is not possible. In a false positive response, a violation of the 
rule is not possible, but the participant incorrectly states that a violation is possible. In a 
false negative response, a violation of the rule is possible, but the participant incorrectly 
states that a violation is not possible.  
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In the previous section, I used a cumulative correct dependent variable that was 
less stringent than the strict correct dependent variable used in the planned analyses 
described in the results section. An analysis of the model with the cumulative correct 
dependent variable suggested that, contrary to my hypothesis, the proportion of 
cumulative correct responses for the greediness detection rule (59.62%) was significantly 
lower than the proportion of cumulative correct responses for both the stinginess 
detection rule (78.85%, p<.01) and the outstanding debt detection rule (80.77%, p<.01) 
and was not higher than the proportion of cumulative correct responses for the descriptive 
rule (56.41%) for the high necessity/high unpredictability resource condition. In the 
previous section, I describe two possible explanations for these results.  
The first possible explanation is that people might have assumed a high level of 
interdependence with their resource transfer partner. If this was the case, they might have 
estimated the cost of incorrectly accusing their transfer partner of being greedy when the 
resource was necessary and unpredictable to be high, which could have led them to err on 
the side of caution. If so, an analysis through a detection theory lens would predict a 
higher rate of false negatives than false positives for greediness detection when the 
resource was necessary and unpredictable. 
In the previous section, I also discuss a second potential explanation for the 
greediness detection results. It’s possible that people’s greediness detection mechanism, 
consistent with my hypothesis, was highly active in the condition where resources were 
necessary and unpredictable. If this was the case, people might not have trusted the 
information provided in the experiment about Chris, leading to several false positives and 
few false negatives. Therefore, the suspicion explanation would predict a higher rate of 
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false positives than false negatives, while the relationship maintenance explanation would 
predict a higher rate of false negatives than false positives for greediness detection when 
resources are necessary and unpredictable. 
To test these competing explanations and analyze the data through a detection 
theory approach, I created a new independent variable and a new dependent variable. I 
created a binary independent variable with a label of “1” for situations in which a 
violation could have been possible (P and Not-Q) and a label of “0” for situations in 
which a violation was not possible (Not-P, and Q). I labeled this new variable 
“Positive/Negative” as a reference to the detection theory framework outlined earlier, in 
which positive is a situation in which a violation is possible and negative is a situation in 
which a violation is not possible. 
 I also created a new dependent variable that measured whether each response was 
correct (labeled “1”) or incorrect (labeled “0”). This new dependent variable was 
different from my prior strict-correct dependent variable because for this new variable, I 
considered whether each individual question was correct, rather than coding a response as 
correct only if all four questions for a given rule were correct. I labeled this new 
dependent variable “Simple Correct”. A data point with a “1” for the Positive/Negative 
variable and a correct Simple Correct response corresponded to a true positive. A true 
negative was a data point that had a “0” for the Positive/Negative variable and a correct 
Simple Correct response. A data point for an incorrect Simple Correct response with a 
“1” for the Positive/Negative variable was a false positive and a data point with an 
incorrect Simple Correct response with a “0” for the Positive/Negative variable was a 
false negative. 
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To test if correct responses depended on whether a violation was possible or not, I 
used generalized estimating equations with a binary logistic model that included a main 
effect of resource type, a main effect of rule type, a main effect of Positive/Negative, a 
two-way interaction between resource type and rule type, a two-way interaction between 
resource type and Positive/Negative, a two-way interaction between rule type and 
Positive/Negative, and a three-way interaction between resource type, rule type, and 
Positive/Negative. I used Simple Correct responses as my dependent variable. 
The results of this model showed a significant main effect of rule type 
(Χ²(3)=52.28, p<.001) and a significant main effect of Positive/Negative (Χ²(1)=4.98, 
p<.05). The significant main effect of rule type is consistent with the results of the model 
with the strict correct dependent variable reported in the results section. The main effect 
of Positive/Negative suggests that there were significantly more false positives (32.54%) 
than false negatives (31.92%) overall. However, the small percentage difference between 
false positives and false negatives, in addition to the small Wald Chi-Square value, 
suggests that this is a small effect. The interaction between rule type and resource type 
was significant (Χ²(9)=21.15, p<.05), which is consistent with the results of the model 
with a cumulative correct dependent variable reported in the appendix, but not consistent 
with the results of the model with a strict correct dependent variable reported in the 
results section. The interaction between rule type and Positive/Negative was also 
significant (Χ²(3)=16.30, p<.01). The main effect of resource type and the two-way 
interaction between resource type and Positive/Negative were not significant. 
The three-way interaction between resource type, rule type, and Positive/Negative 
was not significant. Nonetheless, I ran pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustments 
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on this three-way interaction to examine whether there was a difference between false 
positives and false negatives among greediness detection questions for the high 
necessity/high unpredictability resource condition and I found no significant difference. 
These results do not support either the relationship maintenance explanation, which 
would require higher false negatives, or the suspicion explanation, which would require 
higher false positives. It’s possible that the lack of a significant difference in cumulative 
correct responses between the greediness detection rule and the descriptive rule for highly 
necessary and highly unpredictable resources is due to chance. Thus, it is important for a 
follow-up study to find out whether this result replicates. 
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Each rule in this study is composed of four logical components: true antecedent 
(P), false antecedent (Not-P), true consequent (Q), and false consequent (Not-Q). 
Participants in this study saw four questions for each rule, corresponding to the four 
possible logical components for each rule. Strict correct responses, which are used as the 
dependent variable in the responses reported in the results section, require that a 
participant answer all four of these questions correctly to be counted as a correct 
response. However, it is also possible to conduct a more nuanced analysis of the results 
by considering each question separately. This type of analysis allows us to examine 
whether the type of logical component has an influence on participants’ ability to provide 
a correct response. Thus, we can learn more detailed information about the types of 
mistakes and the cognitive architecture of each detection mechanism.  
To conduct this analysis, I created a new independent variable, which I labeled 
“card type”. This variable used the numbers one to four to identify the type of logical 
component (P, Not-P, Q, or Not-Q) for each question. Then, I used generalized 
estimating equations with a binary logistic model that included a main effect of resource 
type, a main effect of rule type, a main effect of card type, a two-way interaction between 
resource type and rule type, a two-way interaction between resource type and card type, a 
two-way interaction between rule type and card type, and a three-way interaction 
between resource type, rule type, and card type. I used Simple Correct responses as my 
dependent variable.  
The results of this model showed a significant main effect of rule type; 
Χ²(3)=70.60, p<.001. There was also a significant interaction between rule type and card 
type; Χ²(9)=50.61, p<.001. The main effect of resource type, the main effect of card, the 
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two-way interaction between rule type and resource type, the two-way interaction 
between resource type and card type, and the three-way interaction between rule type, 
resource type, and card type, were not significant.  
I also ran pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustments on the two-way 
interaction between rule type and card type to examine this interaction further. One of the 
interesting patterns that emerged after running the pairwise comparisons was that when 
the antecedent was not met (Not-P), the proportion of simple correct responses was not 
significantly different across different rule types. In contrast, the proportion of simple 
correct responses for rules about stinginess (80.14%, p<.001), greediness (73.05%, 
p<.001), and outstanding debt detection (84.40%, p<.001) was significantly higher than 
the proportion of simple correct responses for the descriptive rule (36.17%) when the 
consequent was not met (Not-Q); Χ²(15)=154.62, p<.001. The proportion of simple 
correct responses for rules about stinginess (78.72%, p<.001) and outstanding debt 
detection (75.89%, p<.01) was also significantly higher than the proportion of simple 
correct responses for the descriptive rule (52.48%) when the consequent was met (Q). 
Only the proportion of simple correct responses for the rule about stinginess detection 
(75.89%, p<.05) was significantly higher than the proportion of simple correct responses 
for the descriptive rule (57.45%) when the antecedent was met (P).  
Also interesting was that the proportion of simple correct responses for the 
descriptive rule when the consequent was not met (Not-Q: 36.17%) was significantly 
lower than the proportion of simple correct responses for the descriptive rule when the 
antecedent was either met (P: 57.45%) or not met (Not-P: 62.41%). In contrast, the 
proportion of simple correct responses for the stinginess, greediness, and outstanding 
  79 
debt detection rules did not differ by logical category. These results suggest that the 
higher proportion of correct responses for stinginess, greediness, and outstanding debt 
detection rules when compared to the descriptive rule might be primarily driven by 
cheater detection mechanisms increasing the recognition that a rule could have been 
violated when the consequent is not met. These results are consistent with the findings 
reported by Wason, who found the lowest performance for Not-Q cards in the Wason 
selection card out of all four possible cards (1968). Thus, both the data from this study 
and from the classic reasoning literature find that people are particularly bad at falsifying 
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The results suggested that there was no main effect of resource type on cheater 
detection ability and no significant interaction between resource type and rule type. 
Nonetheless, I decided to exclude unpredictability and test whether considering need by 
itself resulted in a significant effect for resource type.  
To run this new test, I created a new independent variable and labeled it 
“Necessity”. To create the Necessity variable, I labeled both the High Necessity/High 
Unpredictability and the High Necessity/Low Unpredictability conditions as a “0” and 
both the Low Necessity/High Unpredictability and the Low Necessity/Low 
Unpredictability conditions as a “1”. Then, I used generalized estimating equations with a 
binary logistic model that included a main effect of Necessity, a main effect of rule type, 
and an interaction between Necessity and rule type. I used strict correct responses as my 
dependent variable. The main effect of resource type was not significant; Χ²(1)=0.10, 
p>.05. In contrast, the main effect of rule type was significant; Χ²(3)=34.84, p<.05. 
Moreover, the interaction between rule type and resource type was not significant; 
Χ²(3)=2.93, p>.05. Therefore, the significance of the main effects and interaction were 
the same regardless of whether the resource variable considered only necessity or both 
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The tests described in the results section were conducted with 141 participants 
who passed the attention check. Eleven participants were excluded from these analyses 
because they did not pass the attention check question. However, it’s possible that there 
was something unique about the participants who didn’t pass the attention check that is 
significant to the interpretation of the results and that by excluding them, the results were 
skewed. Thus, I decided to examine whether the results changed in any way if I were to 
include all participants in the analyses.  
 I used generalized estimating equations with a binary logistic model that included 
a main effect of resource type, a main effect of rule type, and an interaction effect of 
resource type and rule type with strict correct responses as my dependent variable. For 
this analysis, I included all participants, regardless of whether they passed the attention 
check or not. The main effect of resource type was not significant; Χ²(3)=0.66, p>.05. In 
contrast, the main effect of rule type was significant; Χ²(3)=32.83, p<.05. Moreover, the 
interaction between rule type and resource type was not significant; Χ²(9)=11.28, p>.05. 
Therefore, the inclusion of participants who did not pass the attention check in the 
analyses made no difference with regards to the significance of the main effects and 
interaction.  
 In addition to the attention check, I included two questions at the end of the study 
that served as a manipulation check. These two true or false questions were intended to 
measure whether participants understood that coconut water was necessary, not 
necessary, predictable, or unpredictable based on the condition that they were assigned 
to. Out of the 141 participants who passed the attention check, sixteen failed at least one 
of the manipulation checks. Participants who failed the manipulation check were included 
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in the tests reported in the results section. However, there are points in favor and against 
excluding these participants.  
On the one hand, excluding participants who failed the manipulation check could 
produce results that are unrepresentative of the general population (Aronow, Baron, & 
Pinson, 2015). There might be something unique about participants who failed the 
manipulation check that is relevant to the analyses and thus, excluding them could have 
biased the results. To avoid this potential bias, I decided to include the participants who 
failed the manipulation check in the analyses reported in the results section. On the other 
hand, excluding these participants might provide better evidence for whether the 
theoretical independent variable of interest, in this case resource type, has an effect on the 
dependent variable of interest.  
If the goal of the study were to assess the effect of the measurement instrument 
itself on a dependent variable, participants who failed the manipulation check should 
certainly be included in the analyses. Excluding these participants would misrepresent the 
results because it would not consider that some participants were not properly affected by 
the manipulation or treatment. However, if the purpose of the study is to assess the effect 
of a theoretical construct that is imperfectly induced through a manipulation, as is the 
case in this study, including participants that failed the manipulation check would 
obscure the relationship between the construct and the dependent variable.  
It could be costly to fail to detect a real effect between two theoretical variables 
due to the imperfect nature of the manipulation. If a study tested the effects of coffee on 
productivity and the researchers found that some of the participants did not drink the 
coffee that was provided to them, it would make sense to exclude the participants who 
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didn’t drink the coffee from the analyses. Much like the participants who didn’t drink the 
coffee in the previous example, some of the MTurk participants in this study might have 
skipped the instructions or they might not have read them carefully. Including these 
participants in the analyses would muddy the potential effect of resource type on strict 
correct responses because these participants didn’t receive the manipulation.  
I decided to investigate whether the effect of resource type on strict correct responses 
changed if the participants who failed the manipulation check were excluded from the 
analyses. To do this, I excluded all sixteen participants who failed the manipulation check 
and used generalized estimating equations with a binary logistic model that included a 
main effect of resource type, a main effect of rule type, and an interaction effect of 
resource type and rule type with strict correct responses as my dependent variable. The 
main effect of resource type was not significant; Χ²(3)=1.07, p>.05. In contrast, the main 
effect of rule type was significant; Χ²(3)=36.77, p<.05. Moreover, the interaction between 
rule type and resource type was not significant; Χ²(9)=11.13, p>.05. Therefore, the 
exclusion of the participants who did not meet the manipulation check made no 
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The order in which the four different types of rules (greediness detection, 
stinginess detection, outstanding debt detection, and detection of violations for a 
descriptive rule) were presented to participants was randomized through Qualtrics’ 
randomizer tool. Thus, we would expect that the significant effect of rule type on strict 
correct responses would not be an artifact of the presentation order. Nonetheless, I 
decided to test whether there were order effects that could account for this effect. To test 
this, I created a new independent variable that identified the order in which each rule was 
presented to each participant. For example, if the greediness detection rule was presented 
first to a participant, a “1” was assigned to the order variable for that participant for that 
rule. If the same participant saw the stinginess detection rule third, a “3” was assigned to 
the order variable for that participant for that rule.  
Then, I used generalized estimating equations with a binary logistic model that 
included a main effect of rule type, a main effect of order, and an interaction effect of 
rule type and order with strict correct responses as my dependent variable. The main 
effect of order was not significant; Χ²(3)=0.17, p>.05. In contrast, the main effect of rule 
type was significant; Χ²(3)=35.59, p<.05. Moreover, the interaction between rule type and 
resource type was not significant; Χ²(9)=5.11, p>.05. Therefore, the order in which the 
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